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Abstract
This paper presents a simple theoretical framework in which immigrants have a
relative incentive to cluster in host countries where cultural characteristics and imperfect
information sustain the segmentation of the labor market and a higher wage in foreign
communities. The hypothesis is tested on a panel of immigration flows to OECD countries.
The pull effect of cultural communities is supported and it is found that the minimum size of
a given cultural community is around 5% of the foreign population. It is also found that the
pull effect weakens as the community grows as predicted by the theoretical framework.
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I. Introduction
Until recently immigration to industrialized countries was skewed in favor of
institutionally predetermined ethnic groups. The United States had formal rules for preferred
nations of origins and Canada had similar but informal preferences in its immigration policy.
As a result, from the 1920s until the 1950s, immigrants from Northwestern, Central and
Eastern Europe represented more than half of all immigrants to both Canada and the United
States.
1 In West European countries a very similar concentration could be observed with
immigrants from Southern Europe even though the approach to immigration was different.
To compensate for their chronic shortage of labor, countries like Germany and Switzerland
actively recruited foreign workers in Italy, Spain and Turkey. Finally, France and the United
Kingdom had preferential treatment for citizens from their former colonies (see
Zimmermann, 1996). Nevertheless, in all cases the ensuing skewness in the distribution of
origins for immigrant populations was clearly demand-driven. In the mid-1960s, the United
States and Canada abandoned the preferred origin criterion in favor of skill characteristics
and world events such as the fall of the Berlin Wall led to increased ethnic diversity in
immigration flows toward Western European countries (see OECD, 1995, 1997). One of the
consequences of the lifting of administrative constraints is that the representation of source
                                                
     
1 See Green (1995) and Borjas (1992) for more details.2
countries among foreign populations in host countries has become more diversified and more
supply driven.  
Although the initial triggers for these shifts clearly originate in exogenous factors
such as changes in immigration laws or source-country specific events, the subsequent
shaping of the distribution is likely to have been influenced by various systematic push and
pull factors. In this paper we chose to focus on one particular pull factor, namely the role of
the clustering of migrants by origins in receiving countries as a location determinant for the
newcomers. It is suggested that the existence of a community of the same origin can make
labor market options more attractive for new migrants, thereby lowering the costs of
migrating. As a consequence, new migrants tend to flock to countries where nationals of their
country are already established.
The effects of costs on migration decision have been investigated within various
frameworks. For example, in the theoretical literature, the disutility of leaving a community
for an alien culture has long been integrated in the determinants to emigrate. This non-
monetary cost is introduced through a penalty factor applied to the expected wage in the
receiving country (Harris and Todaro, 1970). Recently, Layard et al. (1992) have used this
model in their study of East-West migrations in Europe after the fall of the Berlin Wall. In
the empirical literature, gravity models applied to migrations suggest that the distance
between the source and destination countries is a proxy for the financial costs as well as the
cultural costs incurred by migrating to an alien country (see for examples, Feder, 1980, Foot
and Milne, 1984, for regional migrations and Helliwell, 1997, for cross-border migrations).3
However, most of the time, cultural costs are measured only indirectly. Furthermore,
these studies do not take into account the fact that migration costs may be variable and even
endogenous. This would be the case, for example, if the relative costs depend on the presence
and on the size of a cultural community which is familiar to the potential immigrant. One
way to integrate the role of communities of the same origin in the host country is to consider
that the relative wages at home and in the destination country can be altered if a sizeable
community from the same origin exists in the receiving country. Using this approach, Stark
(1994) posits that it is cheaper for immigrants than for native-born individuals to identify
whether other migrants are of the cooperative or of the non-cooperative type in trade
relationships. Information costs among immigrants are thus lower and generate a higher
proportion of the cooperative-type among immigrants than among non-immigrants (provided
that each agent deals only with his/her own type only). As a result, immigrants do better than
native-born individuals independently of individual characteristics. Our model generates a
similar outcome but is developed from different premises. We use non-cooperative repeated
interactions between employers and immigrants to show that common characteristics among
immigrants help sustain a higher wage within cultural communities than in the rest of the
economy. Moreover, the higher wage in immigrant communities is explained by the relative
size of the communities and not by assuming lower information costs among immigrants.
This allows for more straightforward empirical testing of the role of cultural communities as
a determinant of immigration flows.
To justify a higher reward in the ethnic community than outside it, the model is set up
within the framework of the efficiency-wage model. If the quality of information about4
workers= non-observable characteristics is endogenous to the size of the market, and thus the
incentive to shirk is endogenous, a higher wage than the market-clearing wage is sustainable
in a small community while it is not in a large market. Within a given country (i.e. in the
absence of formal borders) such a segmentation of the labor market can hold provided
informal barriers like cultural characteristics matter. As a consequence, everything else being
equal, and without constraints on settlement locations within the receiving country, migrants
will have an incentive to cluster. Moreover, the incentive is stronger in countries where these
communities are within some size range, i.e., in countries where labor markets are effectively
segmented. This result is broadly supported by a panel of migration flows to major OECD
countries from the mid-1980s to the mid-1990s. In effect, the size of the cultural communities
matters for the size of migration flows and, moreover, the impact is shown to weaken when
the resident community grows. Interestingly, the pulling role of cultural communities is
significantly weaker in the case of migrations within the OECD. That result is consistent with
the premises of the model that a match between job-specific and immigrant-specific
characteristics and the resulting effective segmentation of markets are necessary to generate a
premium.
The paper is organized in the following way: The next section presents the theoretical
framework. Section 3 develops an empirical strategy and the results of the estimations are
analyzed in section 4. Section 5 offers concluding comments and suggestions for further
research. 
II. A simple theoretical framework5
The theoretical framework is based on a dynamic version of the efficiency-wage
model
2 constrained by the quality of information available within labor sub-markets. More
specifically, consider a new migrant facing two labor sub-markets in the host country. One
sub-market is a small and homogeneous market for migrants of close ethnic background and
the other sub-market is a large and anonymous one. We want to make two points. First, the
equilibrium wage on the small market for migrants may be higher than in the large
anonymous market. Second, this wage differential between the two sub-markets occurs when
the size of the migrant community is within a certain range. In the presence of several host
countries, migrants will thus, everything else being equal, cluster relatively in those countries
where the labor segmentation is effective in producing a higher wage in the small and
homogeneous market for migrants.
                                                
     
2 See Akerlof and Yellen (1986) for various versions of the efficiency-wage model.
A difference between the equilibrium wage is sustainable because of two elements:
job characteristics, which naturally segment the two markets (for instance, language
requirements, contacts with home country), and the higher quality of the information on the
smaller sub-market, which makes it worthwhile to offer a higher wage in order to elicit
higher productivity despite the risk of shirking by workers. For this to occur, the migrant
community cannot be too small because, if it is, the market is unable to sustain specific
businesses aimed at the migrant community and there is no market value for culturally6
specific characteristics. This makes job characteristics identical in both markets. It cannot be
too large either as the quality of the information within this sub-market deteriorates with size
which, in turn, results in a lower efficiency-wage in this market.
To see this more formally, consider the following model with two labor markets for
migrants in the host country. Migrants take the wages as given and  choose only the level of
effort. We denote the one-period payoff of a new migrant as
where ei is the level of effort by the migrant which can be high (i=H) or low (i=L), and wj is
the wage earned in sub-market j which can be high (j=h) or low (j=l). We assume that
wh - eL > wh - eH  > wl - eL > wl - eH 
3 so that,
                                                
3 Note that this assumption implies that the individual labor supply exhibits increasing returns
with respect to effort. As a result, the aggregate supply of labor is not linear in wage but
increasing and convex.
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Migrants are risk neutral and they have different rates of time preference. The migrants=
discount factor, δ , is assumed to be distributed uniformly over the support [0,1].
Potential employers in the host country can be divided in two groups corresponding to
the two sub-markets. One group is composed of n employers with the same cultural
background as the new migrant and the other group is composed of a large number of
employers without defined cultural attributes. Suppose furthermore that wh  ∃  wl is offered by
the first group of employers and that wl is the wage offered by this second group of
employers. Moreover, this second wage is independent of effort and it is simply the
competitive wage in a large, anonymous labor market which acts as the migrant=s reservation
wage in the host country.
The potential high wage in the small labor market comes from an infinitely repeated
game interaction between migrants and employers of this group in the presence of private
information. A new migrant can always find a job with an employer of the n group at wage
wh upon arrival in the host country. However, in subsequent periods, a migrant seeking a new
job finds one at wh  with probability p or a job with the large anonymous group at wage wl 
with probability (1-p). An employer of the n group always pays wh  at the end of the first
period of employment as the migrant=s level of effort is not observable by the employer and
the level of output is observable only after a lag.
4 If, during each subsequent period of
employment, high output per worker, qh, is observed then, this employer continues to pay wh 
at the end of each period. If a low output per worker, ql, is observed during any subsequent
                                                
     
4 For instance, it takes two periods to produce output. Importantly, wages cannot be made
contingent on the ex post level of output due to lack of enforcement mechanism.8
period, the worker is simply laid off.  The laid off worker can still find a job at wh with
another employer of the n group with probability p or  a job with the large anonymous group
at wage wl  with probability (1-p). The probability p does not depend on individual
characteristics and in particular on the number of jobs held by one individual within the small
labor sub-market. As explained below, it depends on the characteristics of the market such as
its size.
Given the above assumptions, the migrant chooses a high level of effort whenever
where  )] e , w (1p)U( + ) e , w [pU( = ) e , w , w u( L l L h L l h . The migrant chooses a low level of
effort if the opposite inequality holds. The left-hand side of (3) is the present discount value
of the migrant=s payoff when the migrant chooses a high level of effort in every period. The
first term on the right-hand side of (3) is the migrant=s instantaneous payoff from shirking,
while the second term is the present discount value of the expected payoff from finding a new
job in every subsequent period, either in the small labor sub-market or in the large
anonymous sub-market. Thus, with (3), if the migrant shirks once, shirking occurs in every
period (stationary strategy). The relationship in (3) simplifies into
Since the two components of this ratio are positive but the numerator is smaller than the
denominator (provided p is not too high), the right-hand side expression is smaller than one.
 , ...) + + )( e , w , w u(   +   ) e , w U(   >   ...) + + + )(1 e , w U(
2
L l h L h
2
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Furthermore, it defines a critical discount factor (δ c) above which the new migrant chooses to
provide a high level of effort and below which the new migrant chooses to provide a low
level of effort in every period. In other words, if the new migrant does not care about the
future (low level of δ ), a low level of effort is chosen whereas a high level of effort is chosen
if the new migrant attaches enough importance to the future (high level of δ ). Since the
discount factor is distributed uniformly over [0,1], δ c also determines the proportion of
migrants who shirk.
An equilibrium with an efficiency wage exists if, given the size of the sub-market and
given p, n, eH, eL, there exist wages such that wh  ∃  wl and the expected profit of each of the n
employers in the small sub-market is at least equal to the profit obtained by simply offering
wl.
Since workers never supply eH and receive wl (see (2)), an equilibrium with wh exists
only if the employer=s revenue effect of an efficiency wage (through higher productivity)
more than compensates its cost effect. In the present model, there are two costs: the direct
cost of a higher wage and the expected cost of shirking induced by the high wage. This has
two important implications for the range of parameters under which such equilibrium holds.
First, the existence of an equilibrium with an efficiency wage requires a minimum
size of the sub-market where the high wage is offered. This can be seen by simply
recognizing that, given n employers in this market, an equilibrium with high wages exists if
no one has an incentive to switch from wh to wl and thus to reduce unilaterally its output. This
requires a relatively elastic demand and if products are differentiated, a large enough market
to avoid significant price effects associated with unilateral changes in output.10
Second, an equilibrium with an efficiency wage also requires a market size which is
smaller than some maximum size. This is linked to the quality of diffusion of the information
and the number of shirkers. Simply put, as the quality of diffusion of the information
changes, p changes and so does the number of shirkers. To see this point, suppose the
diffusion of information among the n employers is perfect such that, all of them know after
one period who among the new migrants is shirking. In this case, p=0 and (4) collapses to the
standard condition,
where the payoff with the penalty from shirking is now U(wl , eL) since shirkers get punished
forever after a single deviation from a high level of effort. Hence, the only job those migrants
ultimately find is in the large outside group of anonymous employers at their reservation
wage wl. For given wh and wl, p=0 generates the lowest value of δ c since U(wl , eL) < u(wh, wl,
eL), and thus the smallest proportion of shirkers. As the size of the small sub-market
increases, the quality of the diffusion of information deteriorates. This implies a higher
probability p as employers can no longer perfectly identify first-period shirkers. Since δ c
increases with p, the proportion of shirkers among the new migrants increases with the size of
the sub-market. This necessarily increases the expected cost of using an efficiency wage.
Hence, for an equilibrium to exist, wh must ultimately decrease with the size of the market.
The probability p does not need to be equal to 1 for δ c to converge to one in which case all
the new migrants shirk. More importantly, δ c does not need to be equal to one for the
 ,
) e , w U( - ) e , w U(
) e , w U( - ) e , w U(
  =     >  
L l L h
H h L h
c δ δ11
employers to find too costly to use efficiency wages in which case wl is the only equilibrium
wage.
5  The previous discussion is summarized in the following proposition:
                                                
     
5 Note that depending on the discount rate, the low effort wage may or may not be high
enough to induce migration.
Proposition 1: Everything else being equal, migrants have an incentive to cluster relatively
more in countries where labor markets are effectively segmented by informal barriers such
as common cultural characteristics. This incentive holds only if the size of these country-
specific markets is within a limited range.
Since the migrant may earn a higher than average wage in the destination country depending
on the existence of a community of the same origin and the level of effort on the job, the
expected income in the country of immigration is not only a function of the competitive12
wage, wl, but also of the size of the existing foreign community (s
f) which determines the size
of the premium in the cultural community. Hence,
Now, the repeated game framework can be coupled with the traditional model of migration
decision where domestic and foreign financial opportunities are major determinants of the
decision to migrate (Harris and Todaro, 1970, Layard et al., 1992). Since everything else is
typically not equal, an econometric analysis at the aggregate level must take into account
additional factors affecting the decision to emigrate. A person migrates if, taking into account
the cost of emigrating (C), the expected income from abroad is higher than the expected
domestic income (y
d). Thus, the flow of migration can be defined as,
with Z representing other determinants of migrations. These factors are developed below
where the variables are described. The migrants' choice of a destination is no longer simply a
function of the differential in average incomes between the source and destination countries
but it is also a function of the size of the population of the same origin in any given
destination country which represents the possibility of earning a premium.
III. Estimations








Since the mid-1980s, the composition of the foreign population clearly shifted in host
countries. Changes in international circumstances as well as in administrative constraints
certainly initiated the shift but our argument is that the ensuing patterns of the migration
flows have been in part determined by cultural clustering. Table 1 provides a few examples of
changes in the size of cultural communities in some OECD destination countries which are
part of our sample and for the period mid-1980s to mid-1990s.
[Insert Table 1 about here]
In Canada and Australia there has been an increase in migration flows from Asian sources at
the expense of the more traditional immigration coming from Europe (U.K. and Italy, for
examples). The Iranian community more than doubled its share in the foreign population of
Sweden, and Portugal increased its presence in the foreign population of Belgium almost
three fold. Meanwhile, some historically strong combinations of source and destination
countries such as Finland/Sweden, Italy/Belgium and Turkey/Germany have weakened
significantly. The role of this section, and of section 4, is to evaluate the dynamics of
aggregate migration flows in light of the model developed in section 2. Two questions are
addressed: First, are migration flows influenced by the presence of residents from the same
origin in the host country? Second, does the size of these communities matter? In other
words, is there a minimum size as well as a critical level for the cultural community beyond
which the pull effect weakens?14
In Figure 1, the top panel shows the total yearly flow of immigrants to the 12 sample
destination countries during the period 1988-1996.
6
[Insert Figure 1 about here]
                                                
     
6 See Appendix I for a complete list of source and destination countries.
The yearly total flow for the countries under consideration is around 2.9 million migrants
with a peak at 3.8 million in 1991. Also, there is a downward trend at the aggregate level
starting in 1991 which is likely due to the tightening of immigration regulations in most
receiving countries (see OECD, 1998, Part C.1). The bottom panel in Figure 1 shows the
average share of each receiving country for the whole period. Not surprisingly, the main
destination country is the US with an average of 36% of the yearly flow. More surprising is
the large share of Germany (30%) compared to a country of similar size such as France, the
intake of which is 2.8%. Canada and Japan have each accepted 8% of the yearly flow and all
the remaining host countries= shares are below 5%. Moreover, the shares have changed over
time. Between the mid-1980s and the mid-1990s, the share of the flows going to the US has
declined from 39.1% to 33.2%. Similarly, Australia=s share has dropped from 4.9% to 3.5%.
Canada, Germany, Japan all saw their share increase significantly. Finally, when the flows
are decomposed by source/destination countries, they are highly variable as the maximum
reached 379,900 for migrants from the former Yugoslavia to Germany in 1992 and a
minimum value of 100 migrants per year from a given source country is quite frequently15
observed. The variations across source-destination countries and through time suggest that
the appropriate statistical set up is that of a panel of observations.
Thus the data set is a balanced panel of 134 immigration flows toward 12 destination
countries and the number of source countries varies between 10 and 16 for each destination
country.
7 The period covered by the sample, 1988 to 1996, has been divided into three equal
sub-periods (1988-1990, 1991-1993, 1994-1996) over which the immigration flows are
summed. From the top panel in Figure 1, it is clear that immigration flows are strongly
serially correlated and this approach minimizes the problems related to the non-stationarity of
variables which is not a trivial matter in panel data estimations. Aggregating over three years
also increases the variability of the dependent variable and avoids potential simultaneity
between the dependent and explanatory variables especially for the cultural clustering
measure. The sample is thus a panel of 402 observations and the corresponding empirical
specification is
                                                
     
7 The two exceptions are France and Belgium with 6 and 7 source countries respectively.
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where i is the source country, j is the destination country and t is the time script. The
dependent variable (yi,j,t) is the number of people who migrated from country i to country j
during sub-period t. The second line in (7) characterizes a fixed effect model which
postulates that µ i,j  is the unobservable individual effect for each combination of source and
destination countries and is independent of time and vi,j,t is a random disturbance term with
the usual properties.
The general specification for (7) follows that of Helliwell (1997) which is a gravity model for
migration flows. Hence, the matrix Xt  includes the level of population in the source- and
destination-country to capture the size effect, and income per capita in the source- and in the
destination-country to capture the relative financial attractiveness of migrating. While an
imperfect measure, income per capita presents the advantage of capturing historical trends
such as chronically low standards of living as well as more temporary phenomena such as
wars or famines.
8 During the period covered by the sample, many receiving countries
tightened their immigration policies and the resulting decline in immigration flows is taken
into account by a time trend. Finally, the pull effect by the population of the same culture is
measured by the share of residents from a given source country in the foreign population of
the destination country in percentage points (CULTSH). Hence, income per capita captures
the average opportunities and the cultural variable, the possibility of higher reward, a
structure which is consistent with (6). The choice of the fixed effect model rather than
straight OLS or the random effect model was determined by the results of the Hausman test
                                                
     
8 A more complete specification could include, for each source/destination country {i,j}, a
measure for the attractiveness of alternative choices of destinations as in Feder (1980) and Foot17
and the single vs multiple constant test. Importantly, the  fixed effect model specification
does not allow for the nesting of the hypothesis of a standard gravity model as it precludes
the introduction of a distance variable which varies for each set {i,j} but is constant over time
and is therefore perfectly collinear with the fixed effect. All the explanatory variables are
measured at the beginning of each 3-year sub-period and their main characteristics are given
in Table 2. The basic log-linear specification is thus,
[Insert Table 2 about here]
with LYDESj,t (LYSOUi,t), the log of income per capita in destination (source) countries and
LPOPDESj,t  (LPOPSOUi,t), the log of population in destination (source) countries. It is
expected that β 1, β 2, β 3, β 5>0 and β 4<0.
IV.  Results
The results of the estimations for the above basic specification are presented in Table
3, column 1.
[Insert Table 3 about here]
                                                                                                                                                      
and Milne (1984), for examples.
v   +     +   TIME   +   CULTSH   +  
          
LPOPSOU   +   LPOPDES   +   LYSOU   +   LYDES   +     =   LIFL
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µ β β
β β β β α18
As indicated by the F-values for equality of constant across {i,j}, the hypothesis of the fixed
effect model cannot be rejected. Also, the Hausman test marginally rejects the random effect
specification in favor of the fixed effect model.
The hypothesis from the gravity model that both population pools matter for the size
of migration flows is not verified as the coefficient on the source-country population does not
appear significantly. It is expected that, ceteris paribus, a larger pool at the source would
generate larger flows. The absence of relationship with the population pool at the source may
be due to the fact that the observations on the dependent variable are on the number of
accepted immigrants. Since there is rationing of acceptances by destination countries and it is
usually based on criteria other than country-size the effect is likely to be biased downward.
9 It
is expected that the number of applicants to emigration would be much more responsive to
the size of the source population. The results also show that only the push-side of financial
incentive matters as income in the source-country is significant and with the expected sign.
The coefficient on the time trend indicates there has been a steady decline in the flows of
approximately 7% per 3-year period.
                                                
     
9 Note that Rotte and Vogle (1998) find a similar result in a study covering African and
Asian migrations to Germany. In their study, the result hold for the total inflow of migrants
and for asylum seekers only.19
We tried to approximate the tightening of immigration policies with the
unemployment rate since most policies are linked to the position of the economy in the
business cycle. The results in column 2 show that the variable could be a substitute for the
time trend. It is however somewhat multicolinear with the population in the destination
country most likely because unemployment is trended in many receiving countries during the
period. Finally, the hypothesis that communities of the same origin in the destination
countries act as a pull factor is supported whether the time trend or the unemployment rate is
used. Moreover, each 1% increase in the size of culturally similar resident population
increases the flow of newcomers by 0.04%. It is worth noting that our results are consistent
with those of Zimmermann (1996) which finds a network effect for broadly defined regions
in the case of asylum seekers to European countries. Hence, cultural clustering of migrants in
receiving countries is confirmed in the simple specification of the model.
It is worth investigating the robustness of the results in general, and of the cultural
clustering in particular. First, we investigate the hypothesis that the role of cultural
communities may vary with some characteristics of the destination countries. We use
dummies to represent special cases of bilateral relationship between source and destination
countries that are likely to affect immigrants= choices and thus, may weaken or enhance the
role of country-specific cultural ties. Two obvious cases are, first when both countries are
linked by colonial ties or speak the same language and second, geographical proximity. In the
latter case, the gain in reduced migration costs due to proximity may lower the importance of
moving to a country with a sizeable community of the same origin. In our sample, 23% of the
observations involve countries which belong to the first category and 12%, to the second one20
(see Table 2). Hence, a dummy is set to 1 when the two countries speak the same language or
are linked by colonial ties (LANG) and another dummy is set to 1 when the two countries are
adjacent  (ADJA). Each dummy is interacting with the cultural tie variable.
10 Results in
columns 3 and 4 show that neither effect is relevant but geographical proximity is somewhat
stronger.
                                                
     
10 In all cases, a scale effect on the flows was also tested by introducing the dummies as
shift variables but they were never significant.
Two other cases of privileged relationships between some source and destination
countries are also considered: First, the fact that both countries belong to the European Union
(EU) and second, the fact that both are OECD members. In the first case, which is 9% of the
sample, the relative easiness with which EU citizens are able to move across member
countries may weaken the importance of cultural ties. Similarly, cultural ties may be less
important for migrants between industrialized countries (i.e., OECD members) than for
migrants from developing to industrialized countries. In our sample, 38% of the observed
flows occur within the OECD. The results in column 5 show that membership in the EU has
no impact. However, in column 6, the cultural tie variable weakens significantly, from
0.049% to 0.017% for each 1% increase in the size of the community, in the case of OECD21
membership. This result can be interpreted in two ways. First, within economically developed
countries, labor market information is more uniform and more readily available, thereby
lowering the likelihood of sub-markets with efficiency-wage setting. Second, the result
reflects a demand-side effect related to the fact that, in most European countries, citizens
from OECD countries have benefited from preferential treatment because of their skill
characteristics. The distribution of source countries is still strongly skewed in favor to OECD
source countries in Germany, The Netherlands or Switzerland, for examples (see Appendix
I). To get some insight into which of the two hypotheses may hold, we exploited the fact that
our sample includes the three countries of traditional immigration, Australia, Canada, USA,
where immigration policies were not restricted to filling labor market needs. We tried to
identify which effect is likely to explain the weak role of cultural ties within the OECD by
testing whether the cultural variable performs differently for flows from OECD members in
this subset of countries. The results are given in column 7. For migrant flows from OECD
countries to Australia, Canada and the US, the presence of a cultural community also has a
much weaker effect. Therefore, whether receiving countries have immigration policies
targeted at the labor market need or not, cultural communities matter less when flows occur
between OECD countries. We, therefore, conclude that the reason why cultural communities
matter less for migration decision within the OECD is likely to be the lack of informal barrier
between sub-markets. Alternatively, job and workers= characteristics are more homogenous
across OECD countries and ethnic specificity provides a weaker information advantage.
The presence of the three traditional immigration countries in the sample offers
another advantage. The flows to these countries are dominated by developing source22
countries and it is of interest whether the fact that these countries= approach to immigration
is vastly different from that of other industrialized nation has an impact on the role of cultural
communities. Hence, we introduced an interacting dummy for the three countries (ACU). The
results in column 8 show that, as far as the cultural tie variable is concerned, there is no
significant difference between the subset Australia-Canada-USA, and the other receiving
countries when migrations from all source countries are taken into account. The coefficient
however is quite large and positive. Coupled with the investigation on immigration within
OECD, this result suggests that it is not so much the characteristics of the destination country
that determine cultural clustering but the matching of characteristics between the source and
destination countries and specifically whether both are industrialized or not.
To summarize, overall the results regarding the role cultural communities play in the
decision-making of immigrant are quite robust and universal. They show that ethnic
characteristics do generate a better outcome (i.e., a higher probability of an efficiency wage
process) in the destination country independently of the goals of immigration policies.
However, the better outcome does not materialize when the source and destination countries
both belong to the OECD set.
The second type of test concerns the shape of the relationship between the size of the
community and immigration flows. The theoretical framework suggests that the size of the
communities must be above a minimum threshold to influence migration flows and that, as
the market expands, information flows less easily and the incentive to shirk increases. So, the
efficiency-wage effect becomes less powerful and the wage tends to move toward the market-23
clearing level. This implies that the attractiveness of a cultural community for new migrants
decreases with its size as the premium does.
Our sample provides a large variability in the sizes of the communities. For example,
Mexican immigration to the United States is not a recent phenomenon and approximately one
in five foreign-born people in the US is from Mexico. Alternatively, there is no obvious
historical tie between Sweden and Iraq and movements of people between the two countries
are clearly recent phenomenons. So, the share of Iraqis in the Swedish foreign population is
still small but it rose from 1% to 4.3% within 8 years. To the extent that the sizes of cultural
groups vary widely we try to identify whether first, the effect decreases with size and second,
some threshold value is relevant to influence immigration flows. We tested non-linearities in
two ways: First, by defining two threshold dummies for 5% and 10% and second, by splitting
the range of sizes of communities into several brackets. As indicated in Table 2, in 39% of
the cases, the share of residents from the same culture is less than 2% and in 15% of the
cases, it is more than 10%. In almost half the cases, the share is between 2 and 10%. The
results for various hypotheses are given in Table 4.
[Insert Table 4 about here]
Column 1 (identical to column 6, in Table 3) gives the reference specification with the OECD
effect but no non-linearities in the cultural community effect. In column 2, the specification
tests whether a threshold size of 5% matters for the elasticity or for a shift effect. In column
3, a similar hypothesis is tested for a threshold size of 10%. There is no shift effect in either
case but the elasticity declines significantly when a single community represents more than
10% of the foreign population in the destination country. From 0.097% the elasticity drops to24
0.033%. Hence, there is a non-linearity in the pull effect of cultural communities. In column
4, the non-linearities are modeled in a finer way and the cultural tie variable is decomposed
into several brackets: share<2%; 2%#share<5%; 5%#share<10%; share$10%. The nonlinear
effect is clearly more complex that the test on a single absolute threshold suggested. Below a
share of 2% of the foreign population, the community is not relevant. However, while
increasing in significance with larger shares of the same culture in the foreign population, the
coefficient also decreases in size suggesting a strong nonlinear effect. A community the size
of which is above 10% of the foreign population is only half as attractive as one between 2%
and 5% for new immigrants.
To summarize, our empirical investigation supports the role of cultural communities
in the location choice by immigrants and in the determination of the size of the flows.
Moreover, we identify the minimum size of the community to be attractive around 5% of the
foreign population in the destination country and there is clearly a decreasing effect as the
size of  the community rises.
V. Conclusion
It is often observed casually that new migrants cluster within countries and across
countries in groups that are ethnically homogenous. In this paper we explain such behavior
with a theoretical framework based on efficiency-wages and imperfect information. We show
that a separate equilibrium for two markets of different sizes with a more attractive wage for
new migrants in their cultural community than in the general labor market is sustainable. Our
cross-country empirical investigation on aggregate immigration flows to major OECD25
countries, between the mid-1980s and the mid-1990s, supports the role of cultural
communities in attracting new migrants. However, the effect weakens significantly for
migration between industrialized countries. Our test suggests that this result is due to a
greater homogeneity of job and workers’ characteristics within OECD members and thus, a
weaker segmentation of markets. Surprisingly enough, the clustering effect is as strong in
traditional immigration countries (Australia, Canada and the United States) as it is in Europe.
We also find support for a necessary minimum size to trigger the effect, and for decreasing
attractiveness as the community becomes larger. The empirical results are consistent with our
theoretical argument that the quality of the diffusion of information about workers’
unobservable characteristics decreases with the size of the market. Thus, workers’ incentive
to shirk increases and the premium disappears as the wage converges toward the market-
clearing level. The peak impact on immigration flows is when a given cultural community
represents between 2% and 5% of the foreign population.
Work in this area could be expanded in several different directions. We shall mention only
two of them. First, clustering is commonly observed at the regional level. It would be
interesting to investigate whether our results are robust within countries, namely whether
regional cultural communities play a similar role as national communities in the location
decision of migrants. Second, the very different clustering effect between migrants from
industrialized countries and migrants from the rest of world suggests that clustering is a
response to some migrant characteristics, perceived or objective. It would then be of interest26
to investigate the nature and the role of these characteristics (for example, individual skills)
and to then compare migrants to native workers to evaluate the value of clustering.  
Clearly, the empirical investigation could be expanded further by investigating whether
cultural communities play a similar role in the location decision of immigrants within
countries since clustering is also commonly observed at the regional level.27




Australia China, Fidji, Hong-Kong, India, Malaysia, New Zealand2, Philippines,
South Africa, Taiwan, United Kingdom2, United States2, former USSR,
Vietnam, former Yugoslavia.
Canada China, Hong-Kong, India, Philippines, Poland2, Sri Lanka, Taiwan,
United Kingdom2, United States2, Vietnam.
United States Canada2, China, Columbia, Cuba, Dominican Republic, El Salvador,
Haiti, India, Jamaica, Korea, Mexico2, Philippines, Poland2, former
USSR, Vietnam.
Belgium Democratic Republic of Congo, Italy1,2, Morocco, Portugal1,2, Spain1,2,
Turkey2, former Yugoslavia.
France Algeria, Morocco, Poland2, Tunisia, Turkey2, former Yugoslavia.
Germany Greece1,2, Hungary, Italy1,2, Morocco, Portugal1,2, Romania, Spain1,2,
Turkey2, United States2, former Yugoslavia.
Hungary China, Germany2, Greece2, Israel, Poland2,  Romania, Russia, Slovakia,
Ukraine, United Kingdom2, Vietnam, former Yugoslavia.
Japan Brazil, Canada2, China, Germany2, Korea2, Peru, Philippines, Taiwan,
Thailand, United Kingdom2, United States2.
The Netherlands Belgium1,2, France1,2, Germany1,2, Italy1,2, Morocco, Poland2, Suriname,
Turkey2, United Kingdom1,2, United States2.
Norway Denmark1,2, Germany1,2, Iran, Pakistan, Philippines, Poland2, Somalia,
Sri Lanka, Sweden1,2, Turkey2, United Kingdom1,2, United States2,
former Yugoslavia.
Sweden Chile, Denmark1,2, Ethiopia, Finland1,2, Irak, Iran, Lebanon, Norway1,2,
Poland2, Turkey2, United Kingdom1,2, United States2, former
Yugoslavia.
Switzerland Austria2, Canada2, France2, Germany2, Italy,2 The Netherlands2,
Portugal2, Spain2, Turkey2, United Kingdom2, United States2, former
Yugoslavia.
1 Destination and source country are both EU members. Sweden since 1994. Norway is part of the European
Space since 1994.2 Destination and source country are both OECD members. Mexico, since 1994, Hungary,
Korea and Poland, since 1996.28
Appendix II: Definitions of the variables.
ACU : Dummy which is 1 if the destination country is Australia, Canada or the United States and 0
otherwise.
ADJA : Dummy which is 1 if the source and destination countries are adjacent and 0 otherwise.
BET2-5% : Dummy which is 1 if the share of a given country of origin in the foreign population is larger
than or equal to 2% and strictly smaller than 5%.
BET5-10% : Dummy which is 1 if the share of a given country of origin in the foreign population is larger
than or equal to 5% and strictly smaller than 10%.
EU : Dummy which is 1 if the source and destination countries are both members of the European
Union, 0 otherwise.
CULTSHi,j,t : Share of residents from the same country of origin (i) in the foreign population of the
destination country (j) at the beginning of the period of the period (t). (ABS, OECD, StatsCan,
USBC). For countries with censuses (Australia and Canada, quinquennial, US, decennial,
France, 1982 and 1990), linear extrapolations have been computed for years between
censuses. For 1990s in the US, the forward-looking country-specific population series is
calculated as the previous year population augmented by the inflow during the year.
IFLi,j,t : Sum of the yearly inflow of immigrants from a given source country (i) into a given
destination country (j) over 3 years (t). (OECD).
LANG : Dummy which is 1 if the source and destination countries speak the same language or were
linked by colony ties and 0 otherwise.
MAX2% : Dummy which is 1 if the share of a given country of origin in the foreign population is
strictly smaller than 2%.
MIN10% : Dummy which is 1 if the share of a given country of origin in the foreign population is larger
than or equal to 10%.
OECD : Dummy which is 1 if the source and destination countries are both members of the OECD
and 0 otherwise.
POPDESj,t (POPSOUi,t): Population in the destination (j) /source (i) country at the beginning of the period,
1988, 1991, 1994. (IFM, WB)
YDESj,t (YSOUi,t): GNP per capita in the destination (j)/source (i) country, constant 1987-US dollars at the
beginning of the period. (WB).
Sources:
ABS. Australian Bureau of Statistics. 1996 Census of the Population and Housing.
IMF. International Monetary Fund. International Financial Statistics. Electronic Databank.
OECD. Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development. Trends in International Migration. Paris.
Various years.
StatsCan. Statistics Canada. Ethnic Origin: the Nation. Ottawa.
USBC. United States Bureau of the Census. Internet release. March 9, 1999.
WB. World Bank. World Development Indicators. Electronic Databank.29
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YDES 17,407.5 29,335.8 2,165.2
YSOU 5,999.9 23,475.2 99.3
POPDES (mios) 55.0 260.6 4.2
POPSOU (mios) 115.5 1,208.8 0.39
FORSH (%) 6.26 75.74 0.001
Dummies
LANG 0.23 - -
ADJA 0.12 - -
EU 0.09 - -
OECD 0.38 - -
ACU 0.30 - -
STO5% 0.34
STO10% 0.15
MAX2% 0.38 - -
BET2-5% 0.30 - -
BET5-10% 0.17 - -
MIN10% 0.15 - -
1 Calculated over 3-year periods.
2 The maximum is 1,286,600 when the amnesty for Mexicans in the US is included.32
Table 3

















LYDES .112  (0.2) -.747 (1.2) .106 (0.2) .042 (0.1) .104 (0.2) .143 (0.3) .068 (0.1) .131 (0.2)
LYSOU -.511 (2.7) -.556 (3.0) -.511 (2.7) -.511 (2.7) -.513 (2.8) -.503 (2.7) -.468 (2.6) -.536 (2.9)
LPOPDES
1 1.401 (2.1) 1.199 (2.0) 1.401 (2.1) 1.379 (2.0) 1.433 (2.1) 1.390 (2.1) .870 (1.5) 1.379 (2.0)
LPOPSOU -.922 (1.3) -.869 (1.3) -.932 (1.3) -.989 (1.4) -.882 (1.2) -.808 (1.1) -1.07 (3.2) -1.01 (1.4)
TIME -.072 (1.6) - -.071 (1.6) -.065 (1.5) -.076 (1.7) -.080 (1.8) -.071 (1.6) -.071 (1.6)
CULTSH. .041 (2.8) .039 (2.7) .040 (2.6) .029 (1.7) .042 (2.8) .049 (3.2) .044 (3.1) .037 (2.5)
UNEMP. RATE - -.030 (2.2) ------
LANG*CULTSH - - .007 (0.1) - - - - -
ADJA*CULTSH - - - .039 (1.2) - - - -
E U * C U L T S H ---- . 009 (0.5) - - -
O E C D * C U L T S H ----- - . 032 (1.7) - -
ACU*OECD*
CULTSH
------ - . 042 (2.0) -
A C U * C U L T S H ------- . 089 (1.2)
Adj. R
2 .930 .931 .930 .930 .930 .931 .931 .930
n 402 402 402 402 402 402 402 402
LM Heterosc
2 .016 (.90) .004 (.95) .013 (.91) .001 (.98) .020 (.89) .268 (.61) .278 (.60) .031 (.86)
D.W. 1.65 1.65 1.65 1.66 1.65 1.66 1.66 1.65
F-test (H0:α i=α )
3 12.28 (.00) 12.41 (.00) 12.08 (.00) 12.25 (.00) 12.25 (.00) 12.31 (.00) 12.53 (.00) 11.62 (.00)
Hausman Test
4 13.5 (.02) 35.1 (.00) 13.4 (.04) 14.4 (.03) 13.3 (.04) 17.9 (.01) 35.4 (.00) 14.1 (.03)
1 Absolute t-values in parentheses.
2 P-values in parentheses.
3 The hypothesis is that all intercept are equal vs fixed effect model.
4 Random effect vs fixed effect model. The random effect model is rejected in all cases.33









LYDES .143 (0.3) .067 (0.1) .029 (0.1) .222 (0.4)
LYSOU -.503 (2.7) -.487 (2.6) -.455 (2.4) -.512 (2.7)
LPOPDES 1.390 (2.1) 1.427 (2.1) 1.534 (2.2) 1.278 (1.9)
LPOPSOU -.808 (1.1) -.793 (1.1) -.765 (1.1) -.800 (1.1)
TIME -.080 (1.8) -.087 (1.9) -.094 (2.1) -.085 (1.9)
CULTSH .049 (3.2) .091 (1.8) .097 (2.9) -
OECD*CULTSH -.032 (1.7) -.031 (1.9) -.030 (1.6) -.031 (1.7)
STO5%
(share < 5%)
- .180 (0.7) - -
STO5%*CULTSH - -.048 (0.9) - -
STO10%
(share < 10%)
- - .636 (1.6) -
STO10%*CULTSH - - -.064 (1.7) -
MAX2%*CULTSH
(share < 2%)
- - - .154 (1.5)
BET2-5%*CULTSH
(2% #  share < 5%)
- - - .095 (2.1)
BET5-10%*CULTSH
(5% #  share < 10%)
- - - .061 (2.3)
MIN10%*CULTSH
(share ∃  10%)
- - - .046 (3.0)
Adj. R
2 .931 .931 .931 .930
n 402 402 402 402
LM Heteroscedasticity
1 .268 (.61) .275 (.60) .455 (.50) .214 (.64)
D.W. 1.66 1.67 1.67 1.64
**,
* significant at 5% and 10% respectively.
1 P-value in parentheses.34












1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996
Destination countries: Australia, Canada, USA, Belgium, France, Germany, Hungary, Japan, The Netherlands, Norway, 
Sweden, Switzerland.35
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